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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Samuel Glenn appealed from the decision denying his motion to dismiss his 
2010 DUI charge, which was enhanced pursuant to I.C. § 18-8005(9) (one felony DUI 
conviction in the last fifteen years). His motion to dismiss was based on the fact that the 
conviction alleged to support the enhancement had been dismissed and the guilty plea 
withdrawn pursuant to the district court's 2007 order granting relief pursuant to I.C. § 19-
2604. The district court denied Mr. Glenn's motion based on the Court of Appeals' 
decision in State v. Reed, 149 Idaho 901 (Ct. App. 2010), which held that I.C. § 19-2604 
relief does not actually vacate the conviction for purposes of DUI enhancements. 
Mr. Glenn contends that Reed is manifestly wrong, as it is directly contrary to several 
Idaho Supreme Court decisions and improperly interprets I.C. §19-2604, which 
unambiguously nullifies a prior conviction. He contends, therefore, that Reed should be 
overruled, and as a result, the district court's order denying his motion to dismiss should 
be reversed. 
The State responds by claiming the issue is not properly before this Court 
because the motion below was not timely filed pursuant to I.C.R. 12(d). In doing so, it 
ignores the implicit factual findings of good cause or excusable neglect for the late filing, 
which were made by the district court when it decided to relax the I.C.R. 12(d) rules in 
Mr. Glenn's case. Because there were implied factual findings of good cause or 
excusable neglect for the late filing, the issue is properly before this Court. Even if this 
Court finds an abuse of the district court's discretion in regard to I.C.R. 12(d), the proper 
remedy would be remand the case for a determination of whether there was good cause 
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for the late filing. In addition, even if this Court determines remand is necessary on this 
issue, there are still reasons, justified in precedent, for this Court to review the merits of 
Mr. Glenn's argument. 
The State also asserts that Reed is not wholly contradictory to precedent. This 
argument is based on the State's overly-broad reading of two cases: State v. Robinson, 
143 Idaho 306 (2006), and State v. Parkinson, 144 Idaho 825 (2007). Neither of those 
two decisions actually abrogate or otherwise undermine the general rule, articulated in 
Manners v. State Bd. of Veterinary Medicine, 107 Idaho 950 (1985), which provides that 
once relief is granted in a case pursuant to I.C. § 19-2604, the conviction in that case is 
made a nullity, to be treated as if it had never existed, and so cannot be the basis for 
subsequent punishment. Under that rule, Reed is manifestly wrong because it treats 
such nullified convictions as if they do continue to exist and allows them to be used to 
support future, enhanced charges and sentences. Robinson only holds that, in terms of 
the requirement to register as a sex offender, a different statute governs such relief, 
and it trumps I.C. §19-2604. Parkinson only holds that the scope of the relief granted 
pursuant to I.C. § 19-2604 does not entitle the defendant to have reporting databases 
scoured and all mentions of the case eradicated. It recognizes that the charge is still 
dismissed. Both cases are narrow in their scope, and both are distinguishable from 
Mr. Glenn's case. Most importantly, both decisions reaffirm and rely on the Manners 
rule, recognizing its continued vitality. 
The State also attempts to defend the Reed decision as a proper interpretation of 
I.C. § 19-2604. Aside from being directly contradictory to controlling precedent as to the 
scope of I.C. § 19-2604 relief, Reed engaged in unnecessary statutory interpretation by 
2 
conducting an examination of the legislative purposes underlying I.C § 19-2604 and 
I.C. § 18-8005, rather than simply giving effect to the unambiguous language of the 
statute. Further, even if the Reed Court's foray into the legislative histories of 
I.C. §§ 19-2604 and 18-8005 was appropriate, its conclusions in that regard were 
clearly erroneous, as revealed by the Legislature's stated purposes for the respective 
statutes. As such, Reed is shown to be manifestly wrong for that reason as well. 
Because Reed is directly contrary to several Idaho Supreme Court decisions and 
does not engage in a proper interpretation of the statute in question, it is manifestly 
wrong and shown to be unwise or unjust, and it should be overruled. Additionally, there 
is no contention that the Idaho Supreme Court decisions in this regard should be 
abandoned, and so they are controlling precedent which should be followed pursuant to 
the rule of stare decisis. Therefore, Reed, which fails to adhere to that legal principle, 
fails to follow controlling precedent, and is manifestly wrong, should be overruled. As a 
result, the district court's order denying Mr. Glenn's motion to dismiss based on Reed 
should be reversed and the case remanded for a trial on the misdemeanor DUI. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated 
in Mr. Glenn's Appellant's Brief. They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, but are 
incorporated herein by reference thereto. 
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ISSUE 
Whether State v. Reed, 149 Idaho 901 (Ct. App. 2010), should be overruled, such that it 
was error to allow the State to enhance Mr. Glenn's sentence for driving under the 
influence because he has "pled guilty or has been found guilty of a felony violation of 
[the relevant code sections], notwithstanding the form of the judgment(s) or withheld 
judgment(s) ... within fifteen (15) years" where the necessary prior convictions no 
longer exists as the prior guilty plea had been withdrawn and the case dismissed. 
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ARGUMENT 
State v. Reed, 149 Idaho 901 (Ct. App. 2010), Should Be Overruled, Such That It 
Was Error To Allow The State To Enhance Mr. Glenn's Sentence For Driving Under 
The Influence Because He Had "Pled Guilty Or Has Been Found Guilty Of A Felony 
Violation Of [The Relevant Code Sections], Notwithstanding The Form Of The 
Judgment(s) Or Withheld Judgment(s) ... Within Fifteen (15) Years" Where The 
Necessary Prior Conviction No Longer Exists As The Prior Guilty Plea Had Been 
Withdrawn And The Case Dismissed 
A. Introduction 
Because the district court implicitly found that there was good cause or 
excusable neglect in regard to the timeliness of the filing of the motion to dismiss, 
Mr. Glenn's claim on appeal is properly before this Court. Alternatively, even if the 
district court made no such implicit finding, the proper remedy is remand for a hearing, 
not affirmation of the district court's order denying Mr. Glenn's motion to dismiss. At any 
rate, there are sound reasons, such as judicial efficiency, for this Court to consider the 
merits of Mr. Glenn's argument even if such remand is necessary. 
In regard to the merits of Mr. Glenn's claim, the Idaho Supreme Court decisions 
consistently reaffirm the rule set forth in Manners: once relief is granted pursuant to 
I.c. § 19-2604, the conviction at issue is dismissed, becomes a nullity, and, as a result, 
cannot be used as the basis for future punishment. Therefore, from the moment such 
relief is granted onward, there is no valid conviction on the person's record. The Idaho 
Supreme Court has also made it clear that, in cases where a charge requires the State 
to prove the existence of a predicate offense, there must be a valid, outstanding event 
of conviction on the record in order for that charge to withstand a motion to dismiss. 
As Mr. Glenn received relief pursuant to I.C. §19-2604, there was no valid, 
outstanding event of conviction on his record upon which the State could have premised 
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the enhanced charge, and therefore, Mr. Glenn's motion to dismiss should have been 
granted. The Court of Appeals' decision to the contrary in Reed is directly contradictory 
to the Idaho Supreme Court precedent in this regard and engaged in an improper and 
clearly erroneous interpretation of the statute. Therefore, Reed is manifestly wrong or 
otherwise unwise and unjust and should be overruled, and, as a result, the district 
court's order denying Mr. Glenn's motion to dismiss should be overruled. 
B. This Court Has The Authority To Consider Mr. Glenn's Claims Even Though His 
Motion To Dismiss Was Untimely Under I.C.R. 12(d) Because Of The District 
Court's Implicit Findings In That Regard 
While the State did challenge Mr. Glenn's motion to dismiss on the basis of 
timeliness pursuant to I.C.R. 12(d), the district court, in an exercise of its discretion, 
"relieve[d] Defendant of his failure to comply with [I.C.R. 12(d)]." (R., p.??) I.C.R. 12(d) 
provides: "The court in its discretion may shorten or enlarge the time provided herein, 
and for good cause shown, or for excusable neglect, may relieve a party for failure to 
comply with this rule." The district court's decision, when given the deference due to it, 
was proper, and so the argument on appeal is properly before this Court. 
1. The Issues In This Case Are Properly Before This Court Because The 
District Court Implicitly Made The Necessary Findings Regarding Good 
Cause Or Excusable Neglect 
While the district court may not have articulated the reasons for its decision to 
relax the I.C.R. 12(d) time limit in this case, those reasons were implied from the record. 
The Idaho Supreme Court has recognized that certain findings of fact may not actually 
be articulated, but, based on the record, were nevertheless implicitly made, and should 
be given effect. See State v. Kirkwood, 111 Idaho 623, 625 (1986). When reviewing 
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implicit findings of fact in the district court's ruling, all presumptions are construed in 
favor of the exercise of discretion. State v. Clark, 124 Idaho 308, 315 (Ct. App. 1993). 
In such circumstances, "the implicit findings of the trial court .. should be 
overturned only if not supported by substantial evidence .... '[a]1I presumptions favor 
the [trial court's] exercise of [the power to weight [sic] the evidence and draw factual 
inferences] and the trial court's findings on such matters, whether express or implied, 
must be upheld if they are supported by substantial evidence."'1 Id. (quoting 
People v. Lawler, 507 P.2d 621, 623 (Cal. 1973)) (emphasis from Kirkwood). Such an 
appellate review is appropriate because, where the record does not actually contradict 
the district court's exercise of discretion, the appellate courts "will not presume error." 
State v. Smith, 1 Idaho 771, 773 (Ct. App. 1995); see also State v. Coma, 133 Idaho 
29, 34 (Ct. App. 1999) (holding that, where the record is silent, the silence is "presumed 
to support the actions of the trial court"). Additionally, "the burden is upon one who 
asserts the law was not complied with, to show that fact, and that he was prejudiced 
thereby. 'All the presumptions are in favor of the regularity of the proceedings of courts 
of record.'" Jackson v. State, 87 Idaho 267, 276-77 (1964) (quoting State v. Suttles, 13 
Idaho 88, 92 (1907)); see also Bradbury v. Idaho Judicial Council, 149 Idaho 107, 118 
(2009) (noting that judges are presumed to know and follow the law). Therefore, 
because regularity is presumed, the unstated reason for the district court's decision in 
regard to I.C.R. 12(d) should be presumed to conform to the law. 
1 The term "must" establishes a mandatory duty to act in a certain manner, whereas 
"may" would authorize, but not require, the proscribed action. Rife v. Long, 127 Idaho 
841, 848 (1995). 
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To that end, if the record demonstrates that the district court made implicit 
findings of fact, and those facts are supported by the record, this Court should reject 
the State's arguments on I.C.R. 12(d). The implicit findings would constitute a proper 
justification of the district court's exercise of discretion to relax the I.C.R. 12(d) timing 
rules. See, e.g., Kirkwood, 111 Idaho at 625; Clark, 124 Idaho at 315. The law is clear 
in regard to the decision to relax the I.C.R. 12(d) rules: considering untimely motions 
simply because the issue presented therein is meritorious without requiring the affected 
party to present evidence of good cause or excusable neglect constitutes erroneous 
action on the district court's behalf. State v. Dice, 126 Idaho 595, 597 (Ct. App. 1994). 
Given that the district court is presumed to know and follow that law, see Bradbury, 149 
Idaho at 118; Jackson 87 Idaho at 276-77, it follows that the district court is presumed to 
have implicitly made the necessary findings of fact to justify its decision. The State 
admits as much: "the [district] court did not purport to find [the excuse], but considered 
the motion regardless for some unstated reason." (Resp. Br., p.7 (emphasis added).) 
Therefore, the district court presumably and impliedly found good cause to justify 
relaxing the I.C.R. 12(d) requirements (the "unstated reason"), rather than simply relying 
on its belief that the claim was meritorious, as the State contends. (See Resp. Br., p.6.) 
Additionally, as the record is silent in this regard, that silence is insufficient to 
justify finding the purported abuse of discretion of which the State complains. Smith, 
127 Idaho at 773; see also Jackson 87 Idaho at 276-77 (holding that the party alleging 
error (the State in this case) bears the burden of proving the error). Furthermore, given 
that the district court went on to deny Mr. Glenn's motion on its merits based on the 
Court of Appeals' decision in Reed, it is difficult to say that the district court exercised its 
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discretion simply because it found Mr. Glenn's motion to be meritorious. Compare Dice, 
126 Idaho at 597. Therefore, the State has failed to point to any evidence in the record 
that actually demonstrates the district court abused its discretion by relaxing the 
I.C.R. 12(d) rules. As such, this Court should not presume error and reject the State's 
contention in regard to I.C.R. 12(d). 
In fact, the record supports the district court's actions based on its implicit finding 
of good cause for the delay in filing. For example, the record indicates that the nature of 
this motion required defense counsel to engage in a lengthy investigation in order to 
adequately research and present the issue to the district court. Defense counsel 
informed the district court, "[w]hen I first talked to Mr. Glenn ... his position was that he 
was unaware of the fact that the action taken by Judge Horton didn't basically wipe the 
slate clean. But I told -- I told my client what I would try and do is, I would try and 
present the issue again to the court." (Tr., Vol. 1 , p.7, Ls.19-25.) Defense counsel 
stated he approached the issue as "almost kind of like a due process thing .... " 
(Tr., Vol. 1 , p.12, Ls.8-9.) Given that starting point, it is evident that defense counsel 
would need time to put the necessary argument together. 
Defense counsel also described his investigation. First, "I went through the court 
file on Mr. Glenn's original case before Judge Horton.. ." (Tr., Vol. 1 , p.12, Ls.15-17.) 
In order to do that, he would have to had to wait for the clerks to locate the old case file, 
and then arrange a time to review that file at the district court, since taking the file from 
the district court would subject him to "a one-year penalty in the Ada County Jail as well 
as a $5,000 fine." (Tr., Vol. 1 , p.15, L23 - p.16, L.22 (describing his investigation so as 
to explain why the file from the older case was not included as an exhibit with the 
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motion to dismiss).) Defense counsel also stated that he tried to leave as much time as 
possible to accommodate the state's subsequent review of that file as well. 2 (Tr., Vol. 1 , 
p.16, Ls.13-22.) He would have had to do this while attending to all his other clients and 
duties. 
Second, defense counsel informed the district court, "I have trouble in trying to 
explain the whole thing to my client is [sic], it didn't really go away completely because 
the Idaho Court of Appeals' opinion [in ReedJ is, because you entered a guilty plea it's 
still there." (Tr., Vol. 1 , p.9, L.24 - p.10, L.3.) Therefore, "I talked to [the attorney] who 
actually argued -- it was his case, Samuel Reed." (Tr., Vol. 1 , p.8, Ls.8-9.) The purpose 
of that conversation was to find out the specifics on the argument raised in Reed, why 
the case was not pursued to the Idaho Supreme Court, and what defense counsel for 
Mr. Glenn could do differently. (See Tr., Vol. 1 , p.8, L.9 - p.9, L.7.) Defense counsel 
also indicated that conversation could have taken time to arrange, as that other attorney 
has part of his practice in Valley County. (See Tr., Vol.1, p.8, Ls.19-20,) 
Based on all these explanations, as well as all the other inferences, which are to 
be drawn in favor of the district court's power to draw factual inferences in such cases 
and the presumption of regularity, there is significant and substantial evidence to uphold 
the district court's implicit finding that there was good cause or excusable neglect 
justifying the decision to relax the I.C.R. 12(d) timeliness rules in this case. 
See Kirkwood, 111 Idaho at 625; Jackson 87 Idaho at 276-77; Clark, 124 Idaho at 315. 
The State has not pointed to any evidence which actually contradicts the district court's 
2 This indication that it might take the prosecutor an extended period of time to arrange 
such a review also indicates that defense counsel would have needed an extended 
period of time to conduct his initial review of that old case file. 
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exercise of discretion or which demonstrates those actions to be an abuse of the district 
court's discretion. (See generally Resp. Br., pp.5-7.) Rather, it only points to the fact 
that the record does not explicitly state those reasons. (Resp. Br., pp.5-7.) The fact 
that the record is simply silent on the district court's findings does not demonstrate an 
abuse of discretion. See, e.g., Smith, 127 Idaho at 773; Jackson 87 Idaho at 276-77. 
Additionally, the implied findings alone are sufficient to demonstrate that the district 
court did not abuse its discretion. See, e.g., Kirkwood, 111 Idaho at 625; Clark, 124 
Idaho at 315. Because the implied findings of fact justify the district court's decision to 
relax the I.C.R. 12(d) rules, the issue raised by Mr. Glenn on appeal is properly before 
this Court. 
2. In The Event This Court Determines There Was An Abuse Of Discretion, 
The Proper Remedy Is To Remand For A Determination Of Whether 
There Was Good Cause To Relax The I.C.R. 12(d) Rules, And Even 
Then, This Court Should Still Consider The Merits Of Mr. Glenn's 
Argument 
Even if this Court finds that the district court did abuse its discretion in regard to 
I.C.R. 12(d), the appropriate remedy is not, as the State contends, affirmation of the 
district court's order denying Mr. Glenn's motion to dismiss. (See Resp. Br., pp.5-7.) 
Rather, the appropriate remedy when there is an unsupported relaxation of the 
timeliness requirements of I.C.R. 12(d) is to remand the case for a hearing and 
determination by the district court as to whether there was, in fact, good cause or 
excusable neglect for the delay. Dice, 126 Idaho at 597. 
The only reason remand would not be a proper remedy is if the doctrine of "right 
result - wrong reason" were applicable. However, for that doctrine to apply, this Court 
would have to be able to find that the adversely-affected party would actually have lost 
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his motion on the alternative rationale based on the face of the record. See, e.g., 
Agrondyne, Inc. v. Beard, 114 Idaho 342, 348 (Ct. App. 1988); see also 
Robinson v. Compton, 97 Idaho 615 (1976) (recognizing such a determination is only 
acceptable "[w]here the order of the lower court is correct"). Such a determination can 
only be made where an alternative rule of law, applied to the same body of facts, yields 
the same, obviously-correct result. Agrondyne, 114 Idaho at 348. 
However, when the issue in question is one which was in the district court's 
discretion, "there is no single, legally 'correct' answer. The proper response, when an 
exercise of discretion is tainted by legal error, is not to usurp such discretion ourselves 
but to set aside the lower court's ruling and to remand the case. Id. The State admits 
that the determination of whether to relax the timeliness requirements of I.C.R. 12(d) is 
one that is within the district court's discretion. (Resp. Br., p.5.) Therefore, remand for 
clarification on that issue, not affirmation of the district court's order denying Mr. Glenn's 
motion to dismiss, is merited if this Court actually finds an abuse of discretion in regard 
to I.C.R. 12(d) in this case. See Agrondyne, 114 Idaho at 348; see a/so 
Bingham v. Montane Resource Assoc., 133 Idaho 420, 424 (1999) (holding that "it is 
patently unfair to deprive the opposing party of an opportunity to raise a defense to [the 
motion in question].,,)3 
Furthermore, even if this Court determines remand on the I.C.R. 12(d) issue is 
necessary, it should still consider the merits of Mr. Glenn's claim. Compare Dice, 126 
Idaho at 597 (deciding "[aJlthough we conclude that the district court erred by failing to 
3 In this case, the motion in question is the State's motion to dismiss on LC.R. 12(d) 
grounds, and the opportunity to raise a defense is the opportunity to justify the delay. 
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require [Mr.] Dice to offer reasons for the delay, we do not remand for a further hearing 
because of our decision on the merits of the motion [in question]."); cf State v. Alanis, 
109 Idaho 884, 887-88 (1985) (determining that "we reverse the order of the trial court 
granting the motion to suppress, recognizing that the acquittal and double jeopardy will 
no doubt prevent retrial of this matter," indicating that no excessive use of judicial 
resources was necessary given the disposition of that case). Such determinations 
promote judicial efficiency. 
For example, if Mr. Glenn does, in fact, have a meritorious claim and the only 
reason that claim has gone unadjudicated is defense counsel's failure to articulate a 
reason for the untimely filing of his motion to dismiss, the courts would be obliged to 
grant Mr. Glenn relief on a post-conviction petition claim for ineffective assistance of 
counsel.4 Such post-conviction relief would likely restore Mr. Glenn's ability to raise this 
issue in a new direct appeal to this Court. Similarly, if Mr. Glenn does not have a 
meritorious claim, it would not matter whether the district court determined there was a 
justification for the delay in filing the motion. See Dice, 126 Idaho at 597. Therefore, in 
4 To succeed on a post-conviction claim for ineffective assistance of counsel, the 
petitioner must show objectively unreasonable performance by his attorney and 
prejudice arising from that unreasonable performance. Workman v. State, 144 Idaho 
518, 525 (2007) (applying the standard for such claims established in 
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984)). An attorney's failure to timely file a 
motion of this nature constitutes objectively unreasonable performance. Kimmelman v. 
Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 374 (1986) (also holding that the Sixth Amendment claim of 
ineffective assistance is sufficiently different from the claim underlying such a motion as 
to be redressable in post-conviction proceedings, even if the petitioner is procedurally 
defaulted on the underlying claim); Carter v. State, 108 Idaho 788, 795 (1985) (holding 
that, where it was clear the motion would succeed, counsel performed ineffectively by 
not raising the motion to suppress). Such unreasonable performance would assuredly 
have prejudiced Mr. Glenn by allowing the State to prosecute him on an inappropriately-
enhanced charge. 
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the event this Court determines that the district court abused its discretion when it 
relaxed the I.C.R. 12(d) rules in this case, it should review the merits of Mr. Glenn's 
argument. 
C. The Decision In Reed Is Manifestly Wrong And Should Be Overruled 
The State invokes the rule of stare decisis to defend the Reed decision. (Resp. 
Sr., p.6.) That is strange since Reed itself fails to conform to stare decisis. The rule of 
stare decisis requires that the courts "follow [controlling precedent], unless it is 
manifestly wrong, unless it has proven over time to be unjust or unwise, or unless 
overruling it is necessary to vindicate plain, obvious principles of law and remedy 
continued injustice." State v. Watts, 142 Idaho 230, 232 (2005) (quoting Reyes v. Kit 
Mfg. Co., 131 Idaho 239,240 (1998) (in turn quoting Houghland Farms, Inc. v. Johnson, 
119 Idaho 72, 77 (1990))). As such, that rule actually reveals several reasons that 
Manners must be given effect and Reed overruled. 
First, because Idaho Supreme Court precedent is controlling law, it must be 
followed. See, e.g., State v. Morton, 140 Idaho 235,238 (2004). Therefore, the rule of 
stare decisis dictates that Manners, which is still good law, and is reinforced by 
Robinson and Parkinson, must be followed. See id. Because Reed is contrary to at 
least one Supreme Court decision,5 in order to save Reed, stare decisis would require 
the party advocating in favor of the decision breaking from precedent (in this case, the 
State advocating for Reed) to show that the controlling precedents (Manners and its 
progeny) are manifestly wrong or unwise and unjust. See, e.g., Watts, 142 Idaho at 232 
5 The State does not argue that Reed and Manners are reconcilable. (See generally 
Resp. Br.) Therefore, it has implicitly conceded that Reed is contrary to Manners. 
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("stare decisis requires that the courts "follow [controlling precedent] unless it [the 
controlling precedent] is manifestly wrong .... " (emphasis added)). The State has 
made no such argument. (See generally Resp. Br.) 
Rather, the State's only contention in regard to the applicability of Idaho Supreme 
Court precedent is that it is contradictory (i.e., that the decisions in Robinson and 
Parkinson undermine or otherwise abrogate the rule identified in Manners) and 
therefore, a decision purportedly in line with Robinson and Parkinson, but not Manners, 
satisfies stare decisis. (See Resp. Br., pp.10-13.) However, as will be discussed in 
detail in Section I(D), infra, Robinson and Parkinson are, in fact, narrowly-applicable 
decisions which both reaffirm the principle rule established in Manners. The claims 
adjudicated in those two cases are distinguishable from the one Mr. Glenn raises, as 
they only discuss a specific exception to the Manners rule and the limitations of the 
remedy available under that rule respectively. As such, they do not abrogate the rule in 
Manners, or even call it into question, and so, the Manners rule still constitutes the 
controlling precedent in regard to the claim Mr. Glenn raised and which was discussed 
in Reed. Therefore, absent a showing that Manners and its progeny are manifestly 
wrong, those decisions should not be discarded in favor of a lower court's contrary 
interpretation on the same argument. See, e.g., Watts, 142 Idaho at 232-33 (holding 
that the failure to set forth arguments justifying the decision to not conform with 
controlling precedent means that the party so advocating has no ability to say that such 
precedents should not control). 
Second, because Reed is contrary to controlling precedent, it, by definition, fails 
to conform to the rule of stare decisis, in that it fails to follow controlling precedent that 
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has not been challenged as wrong or unjust. (See App. Br., pp.6-32 (demonstrating 
how Reed is contradictory to controlling precedent); see generally Resp. Br. (not 
challenging Manners and its progeny as wrong or unjust).) As a result, Reed itself is 
manifestly wrong or unjust and unwise, as it is contradictory to controlling precedent, 
and should, be overruled to vindicate the plain, obvious principles of law. See Watts, 
142 Idaho at 232. Therefore, stare decisis actually requires that Reed, a decision 
contrary to controlling precedent, be overruled, not deferred to. 
1. The Decisions In Robinson And Parkinson Do Not Reject, Abrogate, Or 
Even Call Into Question The Primary Analysis And Rule From Manners 
The Idaho Supreme Court in Robinson recognized the rule from Manners and 
simply applied part of that rule in a specific instance; specifically, the part that allows 
other statutes to trump the general rule from Manners, a decision in line with the specific 
exception in that regard which is in I.C. § 19-2604 itself. Similarly, the Idaho Supreme 
Court in Parkinson recognized the Manners rule and identified the outer limits of the 
relief available under that rule. Both decisions reaffirmed the primary holding in 
Manners: "[w]here a judgment has been vacated under [I.C. § 19-2604], 'it is a nullity, 
and the effect is as if it had never been rendered at all.'" State v. Robinson, 143 Idaho 
308 (2007), (quoting Manners, 107 Idaho at 952); Parkinson, 144 Idaho at 828 (quoting 
Manners, 107 Idaho at 952). As such, neither decision abrogates or calls into question 
the Manners rule to the point where lower courts are free to ignore that precedent. 
The State reads Robinson too broadly, asserting that the narrow exception it 
fashioned only in regard to the sex offender registration requirements applies to every 
case where relief has been granted pursuant to I. C. § 19-2604. (See Resp. 
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Sr., pp.10-12.) The specific factual situation in Robinson is notably different from 
Mr. Glenn's. In Robinson, the defendant was subject to the sex offender registration 
requirement at the time he petitioned the district court for relief pursuant to I.C. § 19-
2604. Robinson, 143 Idaho at 309. Relief from that requirement was specifically 
governed by another statute (I.C. § 18-8310) and I.C. § 19-2604 has a specific 
subsection which makes it inapplicable in regard to the sex offender registration 
requirement. See I.C. § 19-2604(3). Therefore, the Idaho Supreme Court held, the 
Manners language was inapplicable because Mr. Robinson was not seeking to prevent 
future punishment (i.e., proactive relief) based on a previously-nullified conviction. 
Robinson, 143 Idaho at 309. In reaching that decision, the Idaho Supreme Court did 
not disavow the general rule in Manners. See id. at 308-09. Rather, it simply 
recognized that a specific statute trumped the relief available under the Manners rule. 
Id. 309. As such, Robinson constitutes a narrow exception to the Manners rule, one 
which is governed by specific statutes. 
Mr. Glenn's case is distinguishable from Robinson, and so falls under the 
purview of the rule from Manners. First, Mr. Glenn was not ever subject to the sex 
offender registration requirements. (See generally R.) Additionally, there are no 
statutes which specifically control relief from DUI consequences. See generally 
I.C. § 18-8001, et seq. The Robinson Court noted that the real reason Mr. Robinson 
could not get the relief he wanted was because another statute explicitly governed the 
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question of relief from the consequences of his crime. 6 Robinson, 143 Idaho at 309. 
Specifically, the Idaho Supreme Court held: 
this section [of I.C. §18-8310] does not permit persons convicted of an 
aggravated sexual offense to be released from the requirements of the 
registration act. ... Therefore, it is clear that [Mr.] Robinson does not meet 
the statutory requirements set forth in I.C. § 18-8310 for release from the 
registration requirements and expungement. He can only be released 
from the registration requirements if setting aside of his guilty plea and 
dismissal of his charges under I.C. § 19-2604(1) removes him from the 
purview of I.C. §18-8304(1)(d). 
Id. There, the Idaho Supreme Court made it eminently clear that this opinion only 
applied to the unique situation where there is a statutorily-imposed, ongoing 
consequence resulting from the fact of conviction itself and where relief from that 
ongoing consequence was governed by a different statutory provision.? Id.; see also 
I.C. § 18-8304(1 )(a) and (1 )(d) (applying the registration requirement to any person who 
"is convicted of [an enumerated offense]" or who "[p]leads guilty or has been found 
6 The Robinson decision followed the Legislature's decision to amend I.C. § 19-2604 to 
make it clear that I.C. § 19-2604 did not apply in the sex offender registration context. 
2006 Idaho Laws Ch. 157 (S.B. 1304). (See App. Br., pp.A24-25.) Therefore, 
Robinson did not break new ground or abrogate Manners. Had the Legislature wished 
to remove other specific offenses or consequences from the purview of I.C. § 19-2604, 
it could have done so by similar amendments, but to date, it has not. (See genera fly 
App. Br., pp.A 18-A27.) As such, Manners's interpretation of the effects of I.C. § 19-
2604 relief still governs in the DUI context, as well as most other contexts. 
7 An equivalent situation in a DUI case could be in relation to an administrative 
suspension of a driver's license upon the conviction for DUI. See I.C. § 49-324 
(requiring the department of motor vehicles to suspend a driver's license upon receiving 
notice of a conviction justifying that suspension). When such a suspension occurs, the 
legislature has established a separate set of requirements to reinstate that license. 
See I.C. § 49-328. As such, Robinson would potentially prevent a person who received 
relief pursuant to I.C. §19-2604 and had the underlying charge dismissed from 
challenging the suspension on the basis that there was no longer a conviction on his 
record. See Robinson, 143 Idaho at 309. That, however, would be the extent of 
Robinson's applicability in the DUI context. Were the State in that hypothetical scenario 
to subsequently attempt to enhance a new charge based on the non-existent old 
conviction, the general rule from Manners would control. See id. 
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guilty or a crime covered by this chapter prior to July 1, 1993).8 Because Mr. Glenn's 
case does not fall in the specific scenario that formulates the Robinson exception, the 
Robinson exception does not apply to Mr. Glenn's case and the general rule from 
Manners controls. As such, the new charge is impermissible. See Manners, 107 Idaho 
at 952. 
Second, Mr. Glenn was not subject to the consequence of enhanced future 
charges as a direct result of his conviction; rather, he was only subject to that 
consequence after the new charge was filed. As such, the relief he received in 2007 
was prospective, barring the State's subsequent attempt to impose a new consequence 
premised on the nullified charge in 2010. The enhancement subsections of I.C. § 18-
8005 (subsections (4), (5), (6), and (9)) are clear that there must be a new event of 
conviction before the enhancement consequence applies. See, e.g., I.C. § 18-8005(9) 
("any person who has pled guilty or been found guilty of [an enumerated offense] 
and . .. pleads guilty or is found guilty of a further violation of the provisions of section 
18-8004, Idaho Code, shall be guilty of a felony") (emphasis added).) The Idaho 
Supreme Court has held consistent to that interpretation, requiring the determination of 
whether there are sufficient prior events of convictions to justify an enhanced charge 
under I.C. § 18-8005 to be conducted from the moment of the new event of conviction. 
State v. Bever, 118 Idaho 80,81-82 (1990) (holding that, until a new event of conviction 
8 In the case of I.C. § 18-8304, it is the event of conviction on the crime in question 
which triggers the consequence, whereas, in I.C. § 18-8005, the consequence is not 
triggered until the new event of conviction occurs. Compare, e.g., I.C. § 18-8304(1) 
with, e.g., I.C. § 18-8005(9). 
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occurs, there is not sufficient evidence to support the enhanced charge, which should 
consequently be dismissed). 
The Bever Court considered whether there needed to be three valid convictions 
within the specified time frame in order to allow for a charge under one of I.C. §18-
8005's enhancement subsections to be appropriate. Id. at 81. That Court declared that 
"we cannot reach the conclusion urged by the State that the legislature intended to 
change the controlling event from conviction (or guilty plea) to violation." Id. at 81. 
Additionally, it held that, where there were insufficient events of conviction on the 
defendant's record to support the enhanced charge, the defendant's motion to dismiss 
should have been granted. Id. at 82. As such, it is clear that the applicability of 
I.C. § 18-8005 enhancement subsections is controlled by the number of valid events of 
conviction which are on the defendant's record at the time of the new event of 
conviction. See I.C. § 18-8005; Bever, 118 Idaho at 81-82. 
Therefore, because I.C. § 18-8005(9) required a new event of conviction before 
Mr. Glenn was subject to the consequence of enhancement, Mr. Glenn was not subject 
to the consequence when he received relief pursuant to I.C. § 19-2604. Therefore, his 
case does not fall into the Robinson exception (where the defendant was complaining of 
a consequence already attached to him before receiving relief pursuant to I.C. § 19-
2604) and Manners controls. 
Third, Mr. Glenn's case is different because he is seeking to enforce the relief 
granted him proactively. In 2007, Mr. Glenn's conviction was dismissed and his guilty 
plea set aside. (R., p.46.) From that moment forward, the conviction and guilty plea 
were nullities, to be treated as if they never existed. Manners, 107 Idaho at 952. When 
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the State attempted to subsequently base an enhanced charge on that nullified, non-
existent conviction, Mr. Glenn invoked that order to prevent the State's actions. 
(R., p.43.) That difference means the bar on retrospective application discussed in 
Robinson is inapplicable in Mr. Glenn's case. Robinson, 143 Idaho at 309 (discussing 
the fact that Mr. Robinson was attempting to use I.C. § 19-2604 to undermine a 
previously-imposed consequence, rather than a subsequent penalty). Therefore, 
Mr. Glenn's case does not fall within the Robinson exception and Manners controls. 
In reaching its decision, the Robinson Court took pains to make it clear that 
Manners was still good law; it just was not applicable given the facts and statutes at 
play in Mr. Robinson's case: 
In Manners this Court accepted the proposition that the effects fo I.C. §19-
2604(1) could be overridden by another statute, and the legislature has 
chosen to make all sex offenders apply for relief through the procedures 
provided in I.C. § 18-8310. . . . It is presumed that the legislature 
knew that guilty pleas could be withdrawn and charges dismissed under 
I.C. § 19-2604(1}. 
Robinson, 143 Idaho at 310 (emphasis added). The Idaho Supreme Court went on to 
describe how, exactly, the Legislature went about making I.C. § 18-8310 override 
I.C. § 19-2604, and it is on this explanation that the State hinges its argument. (Resp. 
Sr., p.12 (quoting Robinson, 143 Idaho at 310).) 
However, the State is mistaken in its belief that the situation discussed in 
Robinson arises in the case of I.C. § 18-8005 because I.C. § 18-8005 does not provide 
a specific set of procedures by which a person convicted of DUI must go about 
expunging his record which would trump the procedures set forth in I.C. § 19-2604. 
Compare I.C. § 18-8310. Absent any such alternative procedures or an express 
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exemption of DUI convictions from I.C. § 19-2604,9 the Robinson opinion reaffirms that 
Manners is governing law. See Robinson, 143 Idaho at 309-10.) As such, Reed is not 
saved by Robinson, because Robinson only establishes an exception to the Manners 
rule and that exception is not applicable in the DUI conviction context. Therefore, Reed 
is in contravention of Manners, and is manifestly wrong, and should be overruled. 
Reed is similarly unredeemed by the Parkinson decision, which the State also 
reads too broadly. (Resp. Br., pp.12-13 (asserting that Parkinson stands for the 
proposition that the conviction is not erased for all purposes).) The question in 
Parkinson was only whether, once relief is granted pursuant to I.C. § 19-2604, that 
requires a scouring of all reporting databases and eradicating every mention of the 
now-nullified-conviction from them. Parkinson, 144 Idaho at 827-29 (stating, for 
example, that "[b]ased on the foregoing analysis, [I.C. § 19-2604] does not require or 
authorize the complete expungement of all records and references to the charge"). 
Parkinson takes no issue with the general rule from Manners - that relief afforded 
pursuant to I.C. § 19-2604 nullifies the conviction, making it as if it never happened. 
Id. at 828. Parkinson simply identifies the outer limit of the relief afforded by a Manners 
ruling, namely that the records need to inform viewers that the case has been 
dismissed, but no more. Id. As such, the State's assertion that Parkinson somehow 
allows the conviction to remain for purposes of new, subsequent punishment misreads 
Parkinson: the conviction is dismissed to the full extent described in Manners. Id. at 
828. All Parkinson does is indicate that Manners relief is achieved when those records 
9 No such exemption exists, now or as the statute existed when Mr. Glenn was charged. 
(See App. Sr. Appendix, pp.A18-A27.) 
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indicate the charge was dismissed. Id. It does not allow for the dismissed conviction to 
be used as the basis for future punishment; that is still forbidden pursuant to Manners. 
See id. As a result, Parkinson reaffirms the Manners rule and therefore, Reed, which is 
in contravention of Manners, is not saved by Parkinson. Rather, its manifest wrongness 
is made clearer, as are the reasons it should be overruled. 
2. The Law Is Clear That, To Support An Enhancement Based On A Prior 
Conviction, A Predicate Conviction Must Still Be Valid And Outstanding 
On The Record; The Law Is Similarly Clear That, After Receiving Relief 
Pursuant To I.C. § 19~2604, There Is No Valid An Outstanding Conviction 
To Serve As A Predicate Conviction 
As discussed in Section 1(0)(1), supra, the law set forth in Manners remains 
clear: once relief is afforded pursuant to I.C. § 19-2604, the conviction is nullified, to be 
treated as though it never existed, and therefore is not a valid predicate conviction for 
future punishment. Manners, 107 Idaho at 952; see also Parkinson, 144 Idaho at 827; 
Robinson, 143 Idaho at 309. As a result of the dismissal of the charge, the guilty plea is 
also necessarily nullified to the same extent. Robinson, 143 Idaho at 310. 
Additionally, when it comes to charges requiring proof of a predicate conviction, 
such as those enhancements in I.C. § 18-8005, the law is equally clear: there must be 
a valid, outstanding conviction on the record. Bever, 118 Idaho at 82; see United 
States v. Sharp, 145 Idaho 403, 407 (2008). When read together, the result of those 
two points of law is also clear: when the person receives relief pursuant to I.C. § 19-
2604, there is no longer a valid, outstanding conviction, and so the State would be 
unable to prove the predicate conviction, meaning it cannot meet the burden of proof on 
the new charge, which must be dismissed at the defendant's motion. See Sharp, 145 
Idaho at 407; Parkinson, 144 Idaho at 827; Robinson, 143 Idaho at 309; Bever, 118 
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Idaho at 82; Manners, 107 Idaho at 952. Therefore, Reed, which allows for exactly the 
opposite result to occur, is clearly and manifestly wrong. 
In fact, Sharp makes a very poignant observation in this regard. Mr. Sharp had 
pled guilty to burglary in Idaho, received a withheld judgment, completed a successful 
period probation, and been satisfactorily discharged. Sharp, 145 Idaho at 403-04. But, 
as the Idaho Supreme Court took the time to expressly point out, Mr. Sharp "did not 
move to have his guilty plea set aside and his case dismissed pursuant to Idaho 
Code § 19-2604(1 )." Id. at 404. Therefore, according to the Idaho Supreme Court, 
when Mr. Sharp was subsequently charged in federal court for felon in possession of a 
firearm,10 his "outstanding withheld judgment based on a guilty plea qualifies as a 
conviction under Idaho law." Id. at 407. Given that particular conclusion, especially the 
use of the term "outstanding," the point of the Idaho Supreme Court's comment in 
regard to I.C. § 19-2604 becomes clear: had Mr. Sharp moved for and received such 
relief, the judgment and plea would no longer be outstanding and there would be no 
conviction on his record upon which the government could base the new charge. 11 See 
id. at 404-07; see also Bever 118 Idaho at 82 (holding that, in order to support an 
enhanced charge pursuant to I.C. § 18-8005(3), which required three events of 
10 As with I.C. § 18-8005, possession of a firearm by a felon requires the government to 
prove that the defendant has a valid prior conviction for a conforming offense on his 
record. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). 
11 As such, Sharp, which has the same critical facts as Mr. Glenn's case, except that 
Mr. Glenn was granted the I.C. § 19-2604 relief, is very relevant to this case. (Compare 
Resp. Br., pp.13-14.) It defines when a conviction is valid and able to form the basis for 
a charge such as the one filed in this case. Without the valid, outstanding conviction, as 
described in Sharp, the State cannot prove that Mr. Glenn is guilty of the crime charged. 
With that being the case, the district court's error in denying Mr. Glenn's motion to 
dismiss that charge is evident and the manifest wrongness of Reed in allowing such 
prosecutions is obvious. 
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conviction to prove guilt, there must be three separate, valid events of conviction on the 
defendant's record in the requisite time frame, and that, absent the necessary valid 
events of conviction, a motion to dismiss such a charge should be granted). Therefore, 
since Mr. Glenn's conviction was nullified and his guilty plea set aside before the new 
charge was filed, there was no valid, outstanding event of conviction on his record with 
which the State could prove the element of the now-charged offense. As such, his 
motion to dismiss should have been granted. See Bever. 118 Idaho at 82; see also 
Sharp, 145 Idaho at 407. 
In addition to the clarity of the law provided by the numerous Idaho Supreme 
Court decisions on point, the statute is itself unambiguous in this regard. Where 
statutes are unambiguous, courts err when they engage in statutory construction, such 
as looking at the legislative intent of the statute in question, rather than simply giving 
effect to the plain language of the statute. See, e.g., Worley Highway Dist. v. Kootenai 
County, 98 Idaho 925, 928 (1978); Moon v. Investment Bd. of the State of Idaho, 97 
Idaho 595, 596 (1976); Herndon v. West, 87 Idaho 335, 339 (1964) see also 
Verska v. Saint Alphonsus Reg'l Med. Ctr., 151 Idaho 889, 896 (2011) (reaffirming this 
principle after the decision in Reed). 
I.C. § 19-2604, as it relates to Mr. Glenn's particular factual scenario (see 
App. Br., pp.2-4) is unambiguous: 
If sentence has been imposed but suspended ... and upon satisfactory 
showing that the court did not find, and the defendant did not admit, in any 
probation violation proceeding that the defendant violated any of the terms 
or conditions of probation ... the court may, if convicted by the showing 
made that there is no longer cause for continuing the period of probation, 
and if it be compatible with the public interest, ... set aside the plea of 
guilty ... and finally dismiss the case and discharge the defendant. 
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I.C. § 19-2604(1)(a). It is clear that the guilty plea is set aside (i.e., no longer valid)12 
and the case is dismissed. See id. As such, when the Reed Court determined that "the 
purpose of I.C. § 19-2604(1) and I.C. § 18-8005(6) is to promote rehabilitation and 
prevent recidivism,,,13 Reed, 149 Idaho at 904, the Court of Appeals decision engaged in 
improper statutory construction, attempting to divine the legislative intent of an 
unambiguous statute. See, e.g., Worley Highway Oist., 98 Idaho at 928; see also 
Verska, 151 Idaho at 896. The statute should be enforced as written, which means 
Mr. Glenn's motion to dismiss should have been granted since his guilty plea was set 
aside and his case fully dismissed, leaving no event of conviction on his record to prove 
a violation of I. C. § 18-8005(9). 
Even if the Reed Court properly reviewed the legislative intent of those two 
statutes, its conclusion was clearly erroneous. See, e.g., State v. Henage, 143 Idaho 
655, 659 (2006) (a factual determination is clearly erroneous when it is not based on 
12 Setting aside a guilty plea basically means there has been no determination of guilt, 
such that the defendant's right to have his guilt or innocence determined is restored. 
See, e.g., State v. Gardner, 126 Idaho 428, 437 (Ct. App. 1994). It follows that a set 
aside plea would not trump the jury's verdict of not guilty in terms of that defendant's 
record. Cf. id. While relief pursuant to I.C. § 19-2604 is granted irrespective of the 
defendant's guilt, it still is clear that vacating the conviction and setting aside the guilty 
plea means that the plea is no longer validly on the defendant's record. See, e.g., 
Robinson, 143 Idaho at 308, 310. As such, when a guilty plea is involved, the plain 
language of the statue statute declares the guilty plea is set aside, and so, there is no 
valid event finding guilt remaining on the record after relief is granted pursuant to 
I.C. §19-2604(1). 
13 The fact that the Court of Appeals declared that it was construing the statutes so as to 
review the purposes thereof, rather than simply give effect to the unambiguous 
language demonstrates that, even though the Reed decision includes the proper 
standard of review, it did not adhere to that standard, further demonstrating the manifest 
wrongness of the decision. (Compare Resp. Sr., pp.15 (claiming that "[n]othing in Reed 
supports the assertion that the Court of Appeals ignored the plain language of [the 
statutes in question] .... ").) 
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substantial and competent evidence). The Statements of Purpose for the two statutes 
in question unequivocally demonstrate that the two statutes were not intended to 
address the same issues as the Reed Court asserted. See Reed, 149 Idaho at 904. 
Rather, I. C. § 19-2604 was designed to provide an additional incentive to defendants to 
satisfactorily complete probation or drug court programs, thereby increasing the 
effectiveness of those programs. 2006 Idaho Laws Ch. 104 (H.B. 716) (see App. 
Sr., pp.A26-27). On the other hand, I.C. § 18-8005 was "designed to reduce the 
number of motor vehicle drivers choosing to drive while under the influence of drugs 
and alcohol; thereby making our roads safer for law-abiding citizens." 2006 Idaho Laws 
Ch. 261 (S.B. 1397) (see App. Sr., pp.A11-A12). Simply put, I.C. § 18-8005 is intended 
to serve as a deterrent to other potential offenders, not to rehabilitate a current offender. 
See id. Therefore, the Court of Appeal's conclusion that the two statutes served the 
same goals is clearly erroneous. See Reed, 149 Idaho at 904. The fact that the Court 
of Appeals reached a clearly erroneous conclusion as to the purposes of the two 
statutes and based its analysis, at least in part, on that erroneous conclusion further 
reveals the manifest wrongness of the decision in Reed, further justifying overruling that 
decision. 
Because Reed is directly contradictory to several Idaho Supreme Court 
decisions, none of which are inherently contradictory of the others, but which all 
reinforce the fundamental rule established in Manners, Reed is manifestly wrong and 
should be overruled. There was no valid, outstanding event of conviction on 
Mr. Glenn's record at the time of the new charge because of the relief he had received 
pursuant to I.C. § 19-2604 upon which to base subsequent punishment. Manners, 107 
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Idaho at 952; see also Parkinson, 144 Idaho at 827; Robinson, 143 Idaho at 309. 
Therefore, there is insufficient evidence to prove the predicate conviction necessary to 
prove a violation of I.C. §18-8005(9). See Bever, 118 Idaho at 82; see also Sharp, 145 
Idaho at 407. Because Reed should be overruled, the denial of Mr. Glenn's motion to 
dismiss premised on that decision should also be reversed and an order consistent with 
the plain language of I.C. § 19-2604 and the controlling precedent related thereto 
should be entered vacating Mr. Glenn's conviction. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Glenn respectfully requests that this Court overrule Reed, reverse the district 
court's order denying his motion to dismiss, and remand his case for a trial on the 
misdemeanor DUI. 
DATED this 21 st day of February, 2013. 
BRIAN R. DICKSON 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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